Robo opcoes binarias iq option
I stifled a laugh when a colleague told me that his hotel was on Roo-bin-steen-strab Reußensteinstraße. The answer is dependent on not just your requirments, but the design and functionality of what you are protecting. Take a phone, the requirment is low security but fast response for incoming calls. But high security with no response time limitation for the dats storage on the phone. As far as unlocking the receive call function the security is low because the level of harm that can be done by somebody forcing it is low.
So Something you are. Thus a biometric finger swipe is about as fast as you can get. As far as unlocking the data storage function the security is about as high as it gets for the phone. Does an extra chunk of plastic glued onto the existing, longtime card reader of an ATM ever have a legitimate purpose. So something you know. As the unlock response time is effectively irrelevant entering an unlock string of a hundred or so characters is only an issue for the human mind.
Often people talk of rubber hose Thermo Rectal 5 wrench crypto analysis, which boils down to using torture duress to get you to reveal the something you know. The reality for duress these days is not torture but contempt of court, which boils down to jail time often in solitary untill you reveal the password. As far as I m aware the longest that someone has been held on contempt was in a divorce case and it was 14years 1.
However contempt of court is subject in most places to a reasonableness test thus it can only be levied if you are wilfully witholding information. As I have mentioned before, something you know does not have to be a password, it could also be a time or a place. Which makes things a little more interesting. Therefore if the phone has a time based lock out or other trip the password would not function unless entered at the correct time in the correct place.
There is nothing to say that the place need be in the juresdiction you are in. Likwise the something you know might be the names and phone numbers of people outside of the jurisdiction that hold Password key shares. If they decide not to cough up the right key share there is nothing you can reasonably do about it. Further if there are three or more key share holders there is no way to show if one of them is supplying a false key share.
Thus you can take this information and build a system around it to show that you do not know the information of how to get into the phone data store, just who to ask, who also happen to be beyond the courts reach. Very rarely. Some ATMs have had modifications to make the insertion of shims harder, others clear blocks to prevent earlier types of skimer.
Have a look at Brian Krebs site, he has a page dedicated to ATM skimers and pictures showing not just skimmers but ATM modifications. Hmm where have I heard that refrin befor, was it the US before Obama made it clear the NSA had copies of phone conversations between US senators and right wing Israeli politicos. the leadership here gladly touts iPhones and Androids while in office. Or was it in Germany befor Mummy got outed.
Oh then there was that US diplomat woman who slagged people off over her phone and it got published in newspapers. Yup you ld think people would have wised up by now, especially if they are at the top of a very shaky pile with a very long way for them and their family to fall. I like your ideas a lot. -minimum 2 factor -layered approach -risk calibrated -consider time lock really good idea -multi key share holders for critical functions -time location qualifiers.
call on a properly unlocked phone. The UK law regarding revelation of pw s is disappointing to say the least. The USA police lobby is no doubt patiently waiting for the right situation to reveal itself to robo opcoes binarias iq option a change in the law to jail people for not rele asing pws. It will happen soon enough. Because Security. I call it the BS justification for repealing constitutional rights. Maybe consider something other than symbols, like a knuckle print, or a literal physical key, an image, finger painting.
How about a key that dissolves in water. Then the device can only be opened as a factory reset. I think the issue hasn t been brainstormed enough. Meanwhile, isn t the password still the best possible safe and convenient method of authentication right now. Seems to me, there is no need for authentication to rec. Maybe we should work on better passwords. I remain opposed to standard police based biometrics, especially facial ID which is the golden fleece of World Wide ID.
Does anyone know of bulletin board software such as Vbulliten that implements hardware two-factor authentication such as Yubikey for administrators and moderators. Ideally of course open source. thoth, Why are you distorting what Dingledine says. He said most Tor users don t use hidden services. You are entitled to your Resistance-Is-Futile opinion but you should not stick your hand up someone else s butt and shake him around and make him say it like he s your puppet. The words you put in Dingledine s mouth dovetail remarkably with Sessions slogan, the darknet sic is not a place to hide.
Neither version is convincing in the absence of evidence. And FBI getting lucky catching nitwits is not evidence. As you know, Silk Road was so infiltrated that featherbedded Feds took advantage of the commotion to steal bitcoins for their personal retirement nest eggs. And Cazes put his Alphabay contact email everywhere but on the Goodyear blimp. Neither instance is dispositive of Tor vulns.
It s much more consistent with FBI finding, or eliciting, easy-bust crime by helpless morons, in a cookie-cutter adaptation of their so-called counterterror provocations. The Shadow Brokers are most likely Israel. They stole the emails too. Israel is capable and they want to dominate US politics. Trump acts like he works for Netanyahu. Seem to me, there is no need for unlocking to receive a call on the properly locked smartphone either.
For that matter, receiving text shows up on the properly locked smartphone, among other things. It s really good, especially if and when the same smartphone is also used for two-factor authentication via PIN number. Most states have finally banned texting while driving as two thirds of serious auto accident involve distracted driving. Now Honolulu becomes the first major U.
city to pass legislation aimed at reducing injuries and deaths from distracted walking. They hand-fed zombies cannot handle complexities of human relationships after being trained to just close the tab. They are overweight with low sperm count. Forget marriages and families to repopulate the Earth. From these observations I for one am tired and disappointed in the zombie generations. Who would prefer the intelligence of a cyborg or robot instead.
Maybe the ulterior plan is to reduce the numbers of humans and make Earth sustainable. If this is the plan, its already working. Simply give smartphones free at puberty 13 and supplement with pleasure dolls to supplement the porn. Benefit of Robots With robots replacing people no more wars will there be less of a need for lies politicansadvertising data-mining and eavesdropping spies. Will a robot neighbor better maintain their house like cutting the grass.
Will robot mates change their mood without getting angry or offended. Will robots decrease road rage and accidents. Will robot need health insurance or food. Will robot offer reliable, deeper and life-time friendships. Will a robot do the household chores without complaint. Will a robot be your personal physician and nurse.
Will a robot be better equipped for 24 7 home security. We Can Change The World not. Who can stop Silicon Valley Wall St from creating addicted zombies. Without drastic change, the number of people will markedly decrease in each successive generation. Just as robot capabilities will drastically increase already today social media consists mostly of revenue bots What will it take to reverse this terminal end-game. Meanwhile, fingerprints not only can hacked legally and illegally with ease for the determined adversary.
How about basement income with free Internet access. Then there was. This is what I ve wrote about passwords in my blog couple of years ego. Password had been with us for a very long time and has shown incredible persistence. Despite countless attempts and near-universal agreement to replace them, passwords are more widely used than ever. Poor security is obviously the main concern of security experts. However, since even strong authentication technologies are vulnerable to certain attacks, more details on exactly what is required of a replacement is essential.
robo opcoes binarias iq option s 2011 NSTIC initiative, National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspacesummarizes things concisely passwords are inconvenient and insecure. The summary suggests that the implicit goal is more security, more usability at reasonable cost. There is little to disagree with here; however, it does not point into the direction that would be a suitable replacement. The resources protected by passwords are diverse, from local and corporate accounts, financial accounts with substantial assets, throwaway email accounts, web forum accounts and so on.
Clearly, not all type of accounts have the same security needs. Nor do all people have the same security needs; politicians and celebrities in general may require better protection than others need for banking. What should be the starting point for evaluating technologies for the password replacement. Evaluating the current vulnerabilities for password authentication system is a good starting point.
After all, one of the implicit goal for the new authentication method is more security. While usability and cost are important, they usually take a backseat when increased security is required. The end-users and upper management certainly will disagree, but let us just go with the initial assumption and aim for secure authentication. Password requirements have changed substantially during the years. Long gone are the short alpha and or numeric only password, at least should be at resources where security is important.
Most, if not all systems allow settings password policies that includes complexity, account lockout after x number of attempts and defines expiration as well. Guessing complex and relatively frequently expired passwords is not that productive. It is more of a my lucky day type of guess, if successful. So, what is wrong with the password.
It is vulnerable to key-loggers, social engineering, and password cracking. Arguably, the client devices are the most susceptible for having the account credentials stolen. The source of this issue is the malware-infected devices that had been with us for a long time and will continue in the near future. The compromised host or a mobile device enable cyber-criminals to bypass virtually every two-factor authentication system.
Social engineering is manipulating people so they give up the sought after information. The types of information the social engineer is seeking can vary, but usually centers on account credentials, financial information, etc. Once the account integrity compromised, the social engineeror designee bypasses virtually any authentication system. Password cracking requires the password hash that is stored on the device locally, or on the authentication server. Without password hash, none of the password cracking solution would be able to decipher the password.
Cyber-criminals utilize various means to obtain access to the password hash, such as exploiting system vulnerabilities, client devices and social engineering. With the compromised authentication server at their disposal, cyber-criminals are capable of bypassing virtually any authentication system. Are these password vulnerabilities, or the culpability belongs to somewhere else.
The logical answer is that both the client devices and servers are responsible for the password vulnerability. Otherwise, the biometric or other types of authentication methods may not provide the desired level of account security. Securing these devices should be the first step in preserving the integrity of the account credentials. For cyber-criminals, it does not make a difference, if the stolen account credential is password or fingerprint for example.
Well, there is a difference. It is easier to replace the password than the fingerprint. Not to mention that while passwords are unlimited, fingerprints for the end-user in question limited to ten. In which case, replacing password with other authentication methods may provide a seemingly marginal security improvement. Based on history, securing the client devices and authentication servers is not likely to take place anytime soon.
The security improvement might turn out to be temporary in nature. At least until the cyber-criminals develop malware that exploits different authentication methods with ease on a wide scale. Keep mind that there is malware available now that capable to exploit two-factor authentication method. Thanks for the informative and helpful replies. Thread lightly. If I interpret your comments correctly, I think you are saying, sure passwords suck, but there s no viable alternative at the moment. I also appreciate your skepticism regarding alternatives like biometrics.
If passwords can be cracked, why not biometrics. Must admit I am NOT sure where you are going with, securing the client devices and authentication servers is not likely to take place anytime soon. What s that about. How does one secure a device, other than by password and pin. I am going to jump in here with a thought that seems to have zero traction. My thought is governments and corporations everywhere are secretly and literally stockpiling usernames and passwords in the name of security and profits.
IF I am right whether one uses the username of admin and password of password is no different than using some sort of two three four factor stenographic holographic triple whammy encrypted authentication. Authentication is an unfinished piece of work, that needs to be finished. Clive, Nick P, Thoth, Wael and some others have discussed your questions and these dilemnas in great detail over years definitely do a search for those discussions. What took so long.
I have long wished that operating a phone whilst in locomotion was subject to a penalty. The above doesn t go far enough just crossing the street and isn t much money relative to the activity but it is a start. When I m walking I m looking at everything 180 degrees. One the other hand, some may prefer old mate Darwin to get a say, whereby the penalty for crossing the road looking at phone is wait for it being required to cross the road repeatedly, whilst playing with said phone. Dingledine said that he knew about two thirds of the people running Tor relays and could vouch for them.
Intelligence agencies didn t need to set up their own stepping-stone nodes he said, since they could if they wanted to just monitor those who did run them. I know a great game. It s called take a stick who can poke the most holes. re TOR Dingledine news. I did post that news above and the results was as expected fanboism occurred. thankyou, yes it was because of your link I singled out that ridiculous paragraph. But hey, if the boss says everythings fine then great. Clive Robinson, Nick P, ab praeceptis, Rachel, et.
We assume that TOR is suppose to be a Castle Castle Model to protect against metadata harvesting, interception of communications and manipulation and disruption of traffic. Dingledine even went as far as saying the dark web a landscape of websites concealed within networks like Tor is so insignificant, it can be discounted. It sounds like the Castle is strong against attackers but. we have a feel people we want to discount from it s defenses. The number of times I ve been walking a busy city street to have phone texters literally walk into me not to mention the multiple hazards without even leaving the pavement.
There is basically no dark web. It doesn t exist. If there is no Dark Web, then what is TOR, I2P et. suppose to be. Give it any name, it still does the same function. Nice try justifying to legitimize TOR in front of journos and politicos but not trying to point out that all the misconceptions have their roots traced back to 5Eyes IC, LEA, Def Contractors offensive mission plans to discredit anyone trying to evade tracking and the campaign the Powers That Be trying to smear privacy and personal security is actually working pretty damn well.
The most popular website visited by Tor users was Facebook, Dingledine said. How does he know these statistics unless he s either making something up or he s been monitoring the traffic and have some access methods to get his statistics. Edward Snowden showed that yes, a number of nodes had been run by government snoops, Dingledine said, but not very many not enough to compromise the integrity of the mesh.
How can he prove that integrity of TOR is not yet compromised. Similarly to be fair what can be used to proof that TOR is compromised until we start to pull up reports on Universities in bed with ICs and LEAs to do their dirty work using students as low wage free technicians or maybe let s pretend the mega breaches on TOR didn t occur OK. Again, he says he knows the people but he is not us and we do not know these people who run relays.
He can trust his friends running the relay but why do we need to listen to him and believe his friends. A chap called Julian Jackson found that it was possible, on some Linux systems, for a malicious URL to make Firefox bypass the Tor network and reveal the user s public IP address. TOR proxy bypass bug is a very severe bug and talk about TOR being secure.
You do not need to break a protocol but just break the underlying computing layers and the protocol would simply be useless. This is how Apple s iPhone case was solved by simply finding vulnerabilities in the implementations and not needing to write backdoors or frontdoors. Firefox is still the preferred browser for Tor, Dingledine said, and Chrome is still causing concern due to its proxy bypasses.
Look at the huge amount of CVEs for Firefox, Chrome et. and one would wonder how secure and trusted the computing layers TOR is built on. Shaky grounds at best. The project s software is also being updated to allow for simpler and more secure hosting of sites. Hosting and deploying TOR above Windows, Linux, Mac. Nice try doing them on shaky grounds. At least use them on OpenBSD but hey, TAILS would be very secure right.
All that TOR Firefox Debian Linux Gnome 3 magic. How about a TAILS OpenBSD edition to make it even more secure at the very least. The biggest need is Windows developers, we were told. Most Tor staff are Linux users, but the project is used by heaps of folks on Windows. Just use a LiveCD containing a TAILS OpenBSD edition to boot up and that will be fine.
If the user is too lazy to do a Live CD boot, they might as well forget about security because they are not keen on trying to do something pretty simple like a Live CD boot which is inserting a CD or even a USB boot image into the PC. A benefit of the Snowden leaks is that Tor is seen as the best option for anonymous web use. Try harder to evade their detection and you will probably be flagged. Because there is not many choices anyway and the 5Eyes are very very keen on silencing anyone trying to do just that.
If TOR really wants to provide higher security, the above suggestions need to be used to make TOR more secure but alas, just like any organisation they stagnate. TOR will be honored by having a place on my Hoilydays. the grugq said only 3 of the nodes need to be owned to own the network. for some reason he is or at least was an advocates, albeing only 5 of his advice. It has to do with two basic issues communications security and end point security.
If you think back to the time before the mid 1980 s the big problem in the communications security area was that with the early network or serial terminal communications the password went in plain text along the wire, where it could be easily grabbed via a vampire tap or inductive or capacitive probe. In secure facilities of the time the wires were put in pressurized conduits with preasure sensitive alarms along it s length and the conduits mounted in a way that visually checking them along their entire length was easily possible, and a technician would Walk the Line frequently.
There were other systems used later such as Time Domain Refectomatory TDR and end to end encryptors. To bring the communications security more upto date it s been known that for some time SSL had very real vulnerabilities and now and for the foreseeable future it would be safe to assume in all probablity vulnerabulities still exist. So for the likes of the SigInt agencies like the NSA, GCHQ et al, who all prefere to work one or two steps upstream of a target for their own security.
However for LEO s currently the opposit applies due to legislation and warrant requirments, but that will no doubt change. Thus you have to consider how to make the password only of use to the user not an evesdropper. The original idea for this was a One Time Password. The SigInt agences preference would be to get at the plaintext password in transit by exploiting crypto system faults, rather than put end run spyware on a targets communications end point where it can be found or easily removed.
The incorrect theory was that if it was intercepted it was of no use to the attacker and if an attacker blocked interfered with the communications to the destination machine the user would notice. It was incorrect because a sufficiently clever attacker could make their Man In The Middle attack look convincing to the majority of users, as attacks on banking financial systems have repeatedly shown.
The failure as I ve noted here more than a few times was due to having an incorrect thought process of authenticating the channel at setup not authenticating each transaction. Worse still some people decided that determanisticaly generated One Time Passwords that changed with time would be fine We saw that idea crash and burn with the RSA secure ID tokens, when attackers simply stole the seed values from the RSA tech support system where they were stored. Securing the communications between a client end point and server end point is a very hard problem, but we do know of solutions.
But even if you secure the logical communications channel and authenticate the transactions within it you still have the end point problem. Only slightly less well known is key loggers where a physical device is put between the keyboard and the computer. The most well publicized end run attack is Shoulder Surfing that is you somehow get to see the users fingers move and thus work out the password they are typing in.
Then there are IO shims in the device driver level etc etc which boils down to the reality currently, that anywhere onwards from the nerves to your forearm muscles through to the communications crypto of the security end point is vulnerable. That is the resolution of some EM scanning radar systems is sufficient to see the physical movments of your arms, hands, fingers with enough detail that static passwords can be deduced.
If your security end point is not beyond the communications end point devices then there is a vulnerability to end run attacks, of which there are a great many. The only answer we have to this is to extend the security end point around the user by energy gapping them from the world outside the security end point. Which in essence is what a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility SCIF, pronounced as skiff can do.
But only if it is properly setup and security managed 100 of the time, which is difficult to do. I must admit I m all for it but it will not go far enough. As I ve mentioned before I use elbow crutches. The consequence of this is unless I behave recklessly I move slower than those walking behind me. Thus just like a post or rock in a flowing stream I have an eddy in front of me.
Energy radiated from or to the keyboard and electronics likewise. People comming towards me discover that when they get to me I m not going to get out of the way because it s dangerous for me to do so. So they push back into the oncomming stream and create considerable turbulance when they do. HOWEVER you get the dip5h1ts playing with their phones, iPods, games consoles and even watching movies I see them and I stop, they walk into me, and then some have the gaul to accuse me of being in the way.
Although I have not done it yet the temptation to kick them hard somewhere sensitive then shish kebab them on one of my crutches is getting to the point of irresistability. Perhps a law that would permit me to just stomp on them till they squealed not squelched would stop me from doing one of them serious injury from the shish kebabing they so rightly deserve.
In a way dingledine signs the actually we are clueless declaration without even understanding it. He knows x of the node or whatever people. Nice for him but utterly irrelevant. He d vouch for them. And nsa spooks vouch for surveillance being the best thing for the citizens right after sliced bread. Plus that s irrelevant. The problem with both tor and dingledine is this security isn t based on humpty dumpty bang bang incantations or other social vodoo.
It s based on proper analysis, proper design, proper crypto, and proper implementation. And the measure isn t hey, they re nice pals it s logic and reason. And it s verifiable or not, as in the case of the tor, secure linux distroand spooks swamp of questionable vodoo security. His facebook hint is, pardon me, simply moronic.
One might as well declare crime irrelevant because, duh, hardly x percent are criminal while most people act legally. Summary That guy made an attempt at rather blunt social engineering. Here we have another topic security. Clive Robinson, Rachel. Let his musings be discussed on reddit. I m strongly opposed to any laws against using smartphones or even blindfolding while walking. Reason Such laws would hamper the process of natural selection.
In fact, I m all for opening many covers of manholes on sidewalks. Re War Footing With million of lives nearby at stake, powerful EMP pulse weapons would drastically limit retaliation. The follow-on phases can proceed within minutes. all models are wrong, but some are useful. the particular model behind LTCM won a Nobel prize, but their wipeout almost took down the financial grid. Clive has done an excellent job of explaining the limitations of various models e. the key to success is understanding the limitations of your models.TOR again and again.
to be fair, the Black-Scholes model almost certainly was applied incorrectly, but there also were errors in modeling of risk, which is the substantially same thing as models of pricing statistics. in Austrian economics, the time value of money is a signaling mechanism from savers to businesses about future demand. it is quite difficult to make sound business decisions where the time value of money is set by liars, thieves and murderers. I forgot to include these yesterday.
distorting those signals via non-market mechanisms essentially is the same thing as disseminating fake news. here s todays crop. I m including the space link because I realized yesterday that offering satellite launch service creates an opportunity to inspect and modify the encryption hardware. the theme of today s commnts is quality of information signals. that was discussed a lot in the late 1990 s when a failed Chinese launch of a US satellite had the encryption module go missing.
Police State Watch. further proof that the FBI are dirty Judge balks at FBI s 17-year timeline for FOIA request Politico. Hackers break into voting machines in minutes at hacking competition The Hill. Trump Transition Tillerson Mulls Closing War Crimes Office American Conservative. JG4 and others with an interest in alternatives to coal and nuke energy. Unsurprisingly the Koch Brothers get a dishonorable mention, as does Trump and UK PM Therese May.
You might find this articles from the UK s Guardian about Al Gore and his new film of interest. Also Bush and Putin and one or to other well known names. Better 2nd try at 02 33. thoth, more manipulative quasi-reasoning, in this case labeling, to wit, fanboi-ism, defined for your purposes as any statement inconsistent with the Beevis-and-Butthead Golden Stickers huhhuhhuh-huhhuhhuh-huhuhhuh ridicule campaign, which to be fair was funny the first four hundred times or so. Arbitrary state interference with Tor is an inductive question, since it may or may not be succeeding at any given time.
But the notion that acting to defend your privacy just gets you in trouble, or flagged, or something vague and ominous, that s just standard cop-level scare tactics. The fundamental thing that makes you come off like a government propagandist is the fixation on impugning elements in isolation. When you know that reliability is a complex function of parallel and serial components, and that complexity can work for you or against you.
When you know rational persons use multiple social and technical privacy protections in diverse combinations. It may not be bad faith, maybe it s just ego-involved debate stuff, but you re talking like nobody knows that assemblages have emergent properties, so it won robo opcoes binarias iq option occur to them if you don t say so.
That can either be dishonest or dumb. Either way it fails to make the case. A couple of links that may be of interest. Did you know that the father of information theory, Claude Schannon, also had an interest in using physics to predict where the ball on a roulette wheel would land. Or that he and a graduate built what is possibly the worlds first wearable computer to exploit it. I have an interest in satellites especially micro or CubeSat satellites that get used for scientific tests and act as radio realays for those ordinary citizens who hold Ham Amateur Radio licences.
Well things have got smaller such as large postage stamp size some call NanoSats. Fun as they sound, you have to remember they are moving at a similar speed to flakes of paint that have shot through the aluminium skin of other space vessels, so they are potentially quite deadly. Possibly true. But their computers can t match Narnia and George developed by Kieth Taft. Shannon and Thorp surpassed Taft in theory, physics and mathematics, but they were no match to Kieth Taft s electronics wizardry and innovation in the field.
Only Narnia would fair well against the rigged shufflers of today. I hinted at that to ianf a while back, then again here, but he didn t bite. If you play at casinos, you are being cheated, and legally so. Because regulators aren t well versed on how Random number generators work, or more importantly how the random output is used. Either that, or they re in on it. so they are potentially quite deadly.
All you have to do is search for patents of a famous shuffled brand. Learned a few things and a couple of new words. Fascinating topic. So long as the sprites are lower than 400 miles, it s all good so they say. Scientific American and Discover were my two favorite publications until the mid nineties. The golden stickers animus could be based on a particular set of occupational blinkers.
Ab proboscis, as the most articulate advocate, makes it clearest. Joanna Rutkowska distinguished at least three approaches to security correctness, isolation, and obscurity. Ab proboscis is the apostle of fundie correctness. Correctness would certainly be nice. But Rutkowska, taking the pragmatic approach of a person for whom the computer is a means and not an end, has looked at the world as it is today and chosen to compensate for deficient correctness with isolation and obscurity.
That may be why Snowden, who was pragmatic enough to make fools of the NSA, has chosen to make use of it. Let us hope, for his continued survival, he uses it judiciously and supplements it and complements it and tinkers with it to make its many weaknesses idiosyncratic and harder to exploit. As everyone knows, it would be dumb to rely too much on any one technical expedient. That brings us to the strange part of this reasonable insistence on correctness the name-calling.
Fanboi-ism, humpty dumpty bang bang, incantations, social vodoo. No matter how much you make fun of them, people are going to defend their right to privacy and association and information and expression. That line happens to support DoJ s propaganda campaign of scaring people away from all technical privacy protections. What purpose is served by ridiculing a caricature. It raises the question, Whose side are you on. I m unclear on what Roger s actual point is.
If there are only a few hidden services and thus the dark web is in fact non-existent then a that is very bad for Tor generally because hidden services were one of the main motivating factors for keeping Tor going after the US Government abandoned it. Seriously, come on Roger, do you really mean to suggest that whole game plan all along for Tor was to serve as super secret backdoor into FACEBOOK. Or maybe Roger means to imply that while maybe Facbebook isn t the past it s the future so everyone should be prepared to kiss Mark Zukerburg s ass as he runs for President.
b and if any of those are the case what the hell is the team doing on their much vaunted work to improve hidden services so that they actually work. Is this robo opcoes binarias iq option frosting on the cake to make the honeypot sweeter. Reading between the lines what I hear Roger saying is people, relax, you don t have to worry about Tor because under my leadership we messed things up so badly the whole project has failed its mission.
If you say so Roger. How immensely funny you are. Maiming my nick and using for yourself the name of a colonia dignidad sadist who is accused i. of child abuse. How cunning. Of course that lends lots of credibility to your trying to paint me as an nsa affiliate. Isolation as a replacement for correct software. Unfortunately, you are less smart wrt. Didn t it strike you that isolation must be based on safe code, too, to work.
Plus an attempt at argument by authority. Rutkowska who all but abandoned the oh so great and secure and game changing project I m impressed. Bend it any way you like, fact of the matter is and stays that IT safety and security are vitaly depending on verifiably correct underpinnings and building blocks. Without that you can incantate your Rutkowska. humpty dumpty bang bang all day long in vain. Have a nice day in your voodoo temple.
We need Voodoo Stickers too besides Golden Stickers. Next Hoilydays inspiration would be Voodoo doll themed. It is funny that isolation would do the trick and we have a ton of so-called security isolation and one very good example is ARM TrustZone especially the Qualcomm s QSEE implementation of the TZ. Yes it does security isolation and all that TZ Voodoo and what we have up till now is still holes in QSEE s secure isolation mechanism. We can try to raise awareness of the problems we discover or noticed but nobody cares and some might even start calling us out.
Not worth the effort. Let them continue uninterrupted in their Voodoo Golden Stickers dreamland. I was referring to the historical, current and future security vulnerability of the client devices and the authentication servers. This includes operating systems, applications and the hardware in itself. Patching these is like a whack-a-mole game, as soon as you do one, there s another patch that you ll need to install.
Open or closed source software makes know difference when it comes to vulnerabilities, it never did. And here we are looking for secure authentication, when the platforms in themselves are not secure. In my view, implementing secure authentication should start with securing the platform first. These vulnerabilities allow program logic errors, buffer overflows, man-in-the-middle, or its derivative of the man-in-the-browser, based attacks that can circumvent any authentication method, including SecurID, PIN, biometric, etc.
I believe Ben A posted a news on the TZ exploit news in the first post above and I have refused to answer since I see no point in discussing it here these days. In which case, the password based authentication could be just as good as any other type of authentication. There s a reason why password had survived any other authentication methods. I doubt that beyond the authentication servers on hand, there s an active effort from either parties to do that.
Especially, when more than a billion stolen UID PWD available on the web for download. A for googling your new nemesis knew you would. another sort of stereotypical Tor user. However, citing Rutkowska is not argumentum ad verecundiam. She s not an authority, she s an example of how engaged users go about their business. So in dismissing her, you assume away all the actual human rights defenders who can t wait for your EAL 8 utopia.
What exactly do you do for them, other than making fun of them. Thoth s very good suggestion of OpenBSD-Tor is a case in point. Why hasn t anyone put an iso up on github. Where are the OpenBSD Qubes templates to go with the unikernel firewalls already in place. OpenBSD is a pain in the ass. The features of OpenBSD that make it catnip for hobbyists make it useless for civil society. That s because if your starting point is not human security, all this perfectionistic work is pointless wanking.
Thiel needs MUCH more public scrutiny. I don t care if they make it illegal or not, jay walking laws have not stopped jaywalking. What I want is like a stand your ground law for anyone the varmints walk into, and then have the gaul to blaim the person who was not beying a jacka55. Obviously I don t want a throw them under a bus law, because that has other side effects. Just a law that alows me to take a bit of indignant action to make them robo opcoes binarias iq option that.
A, they were being totaly gormless. B, that gormless behaviour can hurt. Though I do like the idea of open manhole covers, and perhaps a few low hanging branches or signs. If they don t get feedback that certain actions are not to be taken, then there is no incentive for the gormers not to do them. There is that old saying about Children and fools should not play with sharp edged tools.
Whilst I would not wish to lop off their texting finger perhaps a little twisting to give a sharp reminder, much like the old story about children and hot things. After all it is the T sensor that indicate pain when we over reach and cause the autonomic snatch back drop action is we touch something hot. Obviously it follows that pain is part of the natural learning process for dangerous activities. So why should I not administer a little pain to a gormer that walking into a six foot six guy on crutches is not a risk free activity.
Oh and the reason for pain not removal from the genetic pool is so they can show their injuries to their friends who are just as likely to be other gormers and hopefully they will learn with out me having to go to the effort of teaching them the hard way. I am shocked. surplus voting machines purchased in secondary markets like Ebay were made available to security researchers Defcon organizers revealed that many of these machines arrived with their voter records intact, sold on by county voting authorities who hadn t wiped them first.
The Defcon hacking team plugged in a mouse and a keyboard which didn t require authentication and got out of the voting software to standard Windows XP just by pressing control-alt-delete. The same thing you do to force close a program can be used to hack an election. Sometimes technological advancements are due to less celebrated persons. Roger Baldwin, Wilbert Cantey, Herbert Maisel and James McDermott long known by blackjack insiders as the nearly mythical Four Horsemen.
BaldwinWilbert E. CanteyHerbert Maisel James P. Earlier article on Thorp, Shannon, and their computer. Me bewildered. I always assumed that golden stickers are voodoo stickers, albeit glorified ones. Story of four US Army enlisted men who derived the blackjack strategy later used by Thorp. So, I was wrong, and my awsomely sakkure system running in a browser plugin running on lisux-d is not secure with golden stickers alone. I had expected min. 115 bulletproof sakkurity from your cards. Allow me to guide your attention to the proposition that doesn t hold - they will learn.
A quick look at a vulnerabilities ticker or db seems to strongly support my doubts. After 2000 years going at it, the smart bulbs should know that only love and education- can save us. Hatred should be outlawed. Peace and cryptos to all. The reason why OpenBSD hasn t been used as the basis for Tails if probably political. OpenBSD is OS non grata in the US since the remarks of Theo de Raadt about the Iraq war. He was right of course but that doesn t matter.
OpenBSD got black flagged. Since Tails is a US gov financed project they just aren t allowed to use OpenBSD. At the time that Qubes started OpenBSD didn t have virtualization. Err no it s not good, but it is reasonably predictable, which is second best by a long way but usable. And why OpenBSD hasn t been used in Qubes is pretty easy.
Put simply, at 400miles or less there is sufficient atmosphere to have significant orbital drag. Thus the orbital time is short and measured in weeks not years, and the number of orbits is likewise limited. Which means any accumulated error remains small, and they know where they are so they warn the appropriate people so they don t launch a rocket through their their orbit. Hopefully avoiding all that is up there.
Further if there is a Collison and lots of debris, it to does not have time to cascade out before it burns up. I suspect we will see two or three new prefered orbit hights below Low Earth Orbit to alow for experimental satellites like these NanoSats sprites. Such projects will be collaborative between different faculties such as aerospace, electronic engineering, physics. The data collected will have real research value but will only be for a short lived period.
Just to show how daft it could get there is no reason you can not strip the guts out of robo opcoes binarias iq option modern celular phone, replace the radio with something more appropriate and stick it up in orbit with a bar magnet or similar to stabilize it. The lowest of which will be for vanity CV satellites designed by grads and post grads so they have a project they can talk to prospective employers about. You would need a mechanism to flip out a couple of solar panels but that is not realy any more dificult than for a coiled wire UHF dipole antenna.
The odds are better than even that the electronics would still be OK after a year in low earth orbit. Most modern phones have two cameras which point at. I need voodoo stickers, too. 180 degrees to each other.
Coments:27.02.2020 : 14:16 Maunris:
Why didn t anyone else solve it.